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lessee in such a case, nevertheless, still has the lessor at his
mercy in the sense.that the lessor is powerless to effect a
rescission of the contract when it becomes to his interest to
do so, whereas the lessee may terminate the agreement at any
time upon making compensation for the use of the demised
property up to that time.
It seems impossible, at this stage' of the development, to
formulate any intelligible proposition in respect of the distinction recognized by the court between a strictly private and a
quasi-public corporation.
(To be continued in a subsequent number).

THE EXEMPTION OF THE PRIVATE PROPERTY
OF THE ENEMY FROM CAPTURE IN A MARITIME WAR-A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW.
By WIIIAm S. ELLIS.

In early times, before the association and intercourse of individuals had brought civilization to the level at which it is familiar
to us to-day, and before the development of national life had
forced a realization of the necessity of formulated rules to
govern various peoples in their relations with one another-in
other words, before International Law as a science sprang into
existence-it was the custom for a belligerent to seize and
appropriate all the property of an enemy state, or of its subjects, no matter of what kind it might be, or in what place or
under what circumstances it might be found. The wars of
the middle ages were attended by a ruthless destruction of all
the property of a conquered people that the victorious invader
could not carry away, and a belligerent resorted to every
means at his command to cripple the resources of his enemy.
States once involved in war found themselves controlled and
restrained by no rule or custom, except perhaps, that 6T
extending protection to the persons of ambassadors and
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heralds, and even a violation of the sacred character of
these representatives usually failed to call down upon the.
offender the wrath of neutral powers. The wars of those
days were fought to the bitter end, and every citizen of a
belligerent state considered himself and was regarded as an
enemy, and as such liable to the uncertainties of a hostile
position. Not only on land, but also at sea, every advantage
was taken of a victory, and very little investigation was made
as to the ownership of goods found lying in the hold of a
prize. The exemption from seizure of neutral goods on an
enemy's ship was not known, and vessels the property of some
neutral state, were frequently captured if suspected of containing the goods of the enemy, whether contraband of war or not.
But with the advance of civilization and growth of commerce this reckless warfare began to be condemned, and from
more than one motive states gradually allowed themselves to
accept certain restraints upon the conduct of their armies in
the field and their fleets on the sea. From that time until the
present day contests between hostile nations have been growing less and less severe. The needless destruction, or even
seizure, of goods belonging to a non-combatant member of an
enemy state by an invading army is frowned upon to a greater
or less extent, and the question is even generally discussed in
modern times whether it would not be wisb to adopt, as a
principle of the law of nations, the custom of exempting from
capture the goods found on the ships of the enemy but belonging to private individuals of their state. The writers upon the
subject bring arguments of great force and learning to bear
upon either side, the continental jurists being almost unanimous in favor of the adoption of the policy of exemption,
while the English are equally desirous of retaining the old
custom. The American students of International Law incline
to the English view.
Before attempting to determine which is at once the most
justifiable and practical course for nations to adopt with regard
to this question, it is well to examine briefly the history of the
theory and observe the practice of the most enlightened states
of modem times.
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Mr. Hall, in his work on "International Law," has the
following: "That the rule of the capture of private property
at sea has, until lately, been universally followed, that it is
still adhered to by the great majorit# of states, that it was
recognized as law by all the older writers, and is so recognized
by many later writers, is uncontested. A certain amount of
practice, however, exists of recent date, in which immunity of
private property has been agreed to or affirmed." As the
instances of the recognition of states, in both early and recent
times, of the right to capture private property at sea are too
numerous to mention, we will confine ourselves to the consideration of the opposite practice, all of which, as Mr. Hall
says, is of recent date.
During the presidency of Mr. Monroe, the United States
proposed, through a circular letter to the governments of
France, England and Russia, that "merchant vessels and their
cargoes belonging to subjects of belligerent powers should be
exempted from capture by convention." This was in 1817,
Mr. Adams being, at that time, Secretary of State. The
proposal was accepted by Russia in principle, but Russia determined that, unless it should be accepted by the maritime states
in general, she would not act upon it. The refusal of England
to accept even the principle is not to be wondered at, but it is
not so easy to perceive the motive which actuated France in
adopting the same policy.
The Declaration of Paris of 1856 abolished privateering by
a clause inserted by the negotiators without instructions from
their respective governments, but which obtained their
unqualified approval. Mr. Marcy was then Secretary of State
under President Peirce, and when his accession, and that of the
United States was sought by the European powers, he refused
on the ground that it was a "cardinal principle of national
policy that the country should not be burdened with the
weight of permanent armaments. The right of employing
privateers must be retained unless the safety of the mercantile
marine could be legally assured." But he offered to concede
this point if it were conceded in return that the private
property of the subjects of one or other of the two billig-
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erents engaged in a maritime war should not be subject to
capture by the vessels of the other party, except in cases of
contraband of war."
In 1870 Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, declared to Baron
Gerolt that it was his sincere hope that the government and
people of the United States may soon be gratified by seeing
the principle of the immunity of private property at sea
universally recognized "as another restraining and humanizing
influence imposed by modem civilization on the art of war."
This principle, which Mr. Fish was so anxious to uphold,
he had the good fortune to see put into practice to some
extent, through a treaty with Italy in 1871, by which it was
stipulated that private property should not be taken possession
of or destroyed except for breach of blockade or as contraband of war. Italy had already shown its own disposition in
a decisive manner. In 1865 Italy had passed a marine code,
according to which all merchant vessels of a hostile nation
should be exempt from seizure or molestation, provided, only,
that reciprocity should be observed between the two states.
On the outbreak of the war of 1866, Austria and Prussia
declared that enemy ships and cargoes should not be captured
so long as the enemy state granted a like indulgence, and this
was religiously practiced, the war being carried on from
beginning to end, both as between Austria and Prussia, as well
as between Austria and Italy, without the resort to maritime
capture.
The most recent case is that of Prussia, in 1870, when the
Prussian government issued an ordinance exempting French
vessels from capture without any mention of reciprocity.
These seven examples make up the sum total of the practice to be found in favor of the doctrine of exemption, and in
studying them we are forced to the conclusion that they
cannot be accepted as bona fide declarations of international
sentiment. For, in the first place, the view taken of the case
by the United States in 1856, by Italy in 186,, by Austria in
1866, and by Prussia in 1870, was very strongly influenced by
the fact that each of those states was, at the time, in possession of a weak navy and utterly unable to compete with
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-nations of maritime supremacy.
In the second place, even
this small amount of practice is of quite recent date, extending
only over a period-if we except the case of the United States
under President Monroe-of half a century.
There have been, at various times and in various states,
conventions held for the purpose of drawing up resolutions
for presentation to their governments, urging the necessity of
accepting the new doctrine. But an examination of these
petitions of citizens. whose sole idea, apparently, is to foster
the humanizing influence of the law of nations and mitigate
the hardships and privations of war, reveals the fact that they
have usually arisen from the same selfish motives which
actuated the states of maritime inferiority to plead the new
cause, and that the members of these conventions have, in
nine cases out of ten, been the leading merchants and shippers
of their country. Perhaps the most noted convention of this
character was that held at Bremen, in December, 1859, which
M. Bluntchli refers to as "an indication of the modern feeling
with regard to the question of exemption." A more recent
instance, and one which arose from very different motives, was
that of St. Petersburg, in 1874, from which Prince Gortshakoff
addressed a circular letter to the other European powers proposing, on behalf of Russia, to form an international code to
ameliorate the conditions of war, etc. Lord Derby refused to
join, "seeing the ulterior designs" of the Russian Minister,
whose plan it was to emphasize the power of the great military
nations and reduce whatever influence the maritime states possessed. Thus each of these statesmen contended for a principle
which promised the best results for his country; the desire to
put into practice an advanced theory of international law was as
far from the mind of tne Englishman as from that of the Russian.
Since it is thus so difficult to perceive from the limited practice just what the effects of the new doctrines have been, and
since the views of congresses and conventions have invariably
been of a selfish rather than of a broad international character,
it remains to be considered whether or not there is a sound
reason for adopting the policy of exemption from either a legal
or a moral point of view.
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The argument advanced by the continental jurists is,. that
war being "a relation of a state to a state," and not of an
individual to an individual, it results that no individual should
suffer because he happens to find himself the perhaps unwilling member of a belligerent community with whose quarrel
he may have no sympathy. This doctrine is assumed by
Bluntchli as a matter of course, and he thus speaks of it in his.
chapter on the "proprit6 priv~e de l'ennemi :"
"Bien que la guere maritime soit dirig~e contre l'6tat et
non contre les particuliers, et que l'on doive en droit naturel
respecter la propriet6 priv~e sur mer aussi bien que sur terre,
plusiers puissances maritime (and here he refers especially
to England, of course) reconaissent encore aujour-d'hui 6Lla
marine de guerre le droit de saizir et d'amener les navires
qui sont la propriet6 de ressortissants de l'6tat ennemi, et deconfisquer les marchandise trouves a bord de ces navires."
Bluntchli then goes on to say that the merchants of an enemy
state are no more the enemies of a hostile maritime power than
cf a hostile continental power, and that the former should
respect the rights of private persons just as much as the latter.
The above arguments are brought out in a forcible manner
by M. Desjardins and M. Laveleye, and M. Calvo has made
strenuous efforts to induce his own and other governments to
adopt the "modern and more civilized course."
Thus two assumptions form the basis of the arguments of
the continental jurists: (I) That war is exclusively a relation of
a state to a state, and (2) that the private property of an
enemy is exempt from capture in a continental war. Can
these assumptions be supported ?
International law, takes cognizance of individuals only
through their state, the state being the "person" subject to
the dictates of that law, and consequently the fortunes of an
individual, all indissolubly linked with those of his state, come
what may. The individual has no personal, no proprietary
rights, except as a member of his state, and while in times of
peace, he claims and enjoys all the advantages of citizenship, so
in time of war he must bear his share of the responsibility and,
perhaps, of the misfortunes of his country, and this, although
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he may not approve of the war itself or the cause for which it
is waged. Portales, who borrowed his views on the subject from
Rousseau (although generally credited with being their originator), maintains that the "private individuals of belligerent
nations find themselves enemies by accident; they are not so,
as men, they are not so as citizens, they are so only as soldiers." His idea evidently is that when a state declares war
its army should be composed only of those who actively sympathize with the cause, instead of being drawn from the general mass of the people; a very attractive theory, no doubt,
and one which at some distant day may be recognized and
accepted by the most enlightened state; but it must be confessed that thus far little evidence has appeared of its being
put into practice. On the contrary, the armies of a belligerent
are usually composed very largely of soldiers, who fight from
motives of much lower order than the national cause, or who
have been forced into the ranks.
Thus it is impossible to reconcile the various positions, in
which an individual finds himself with regard to the government whose protection he claims with the theory that war is
a relation of a state to a state. It is far more reasonable to
admit that citizens are merely portions of their states, and as
such liable to the chances of their good or bad fortune. Thereis then no reason, from a legal point of view, to exempt the
owners of merchandise from subjection to the loss of their
goods embarked with the knowledge of the risk to which they
may be exposed.
But, laying aside the legal aspect of the question and considering it from a moral, and at the same time, practical
point of view, is there any real reason for regarding the seizure
of private property at sea as incompatible with the modern
standard of justice and humanity, or as of too great severity
in comparison with the other measures of war?
"In the battles and campaigns of a (land) war," says Mr.
Dana "exigencies are constantly arising authorizing or even
requiring the destruction or, at least, the seizure of all kinds
of property." In a hostile country an army must necessarily
subsist upon the provisions and resources of the enemy. But
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invading armies may go, and frequently do go, much farther.
Any property which, if left unmolested, can, in any way, contribute to the resources of the invaded state, is seized and
often destroyed. For the loss of such property the owner
-certainly receives no compensation. And the loss of the
property itself is not always the only misfortune. Searches on
land necessitates the entering of private dwellings, barns, etc.
This naturally leads to resistance on the part of the owner
whose isolated position, if he happen to be so located, is an
encouragement to acts of cruelty and degradation on the part
of soldiers difficult to sustain, and loss of life sometimes
occurs.
On the other hand no property is captured at sea, as Mr.
Dana remarks, but merchandise held in commercio, voluntarily
embarked as such, hicri causd. The captured property is
transferred to the possession of the capturing power by the
decision of a prize court, and such a thing as "booty" or
- loot" (terms applied to the possessions of the enemy seized
in a land campaign), is not known in maritime warfare.
Furthermore, the transfer of private property is accomplished
quietly, without loss of life, for it occurs after the fighting is
all over. The merchant who entrusts his goods to the care of
the captain and crew of the vessel in which they are shipped,
knows that he is taking the chances of war and is prepared for
either event.
The principal object for which the army of a beligerent state
strives, is to cripple the resources of the enemy, in an indirect
as well as in a direct way, as severely and as rapidly as possible, without, however, inflicting upon the non-combatant
members of the opponent power any more injury or outrage
than is necessary and fair. By taking possession of the
enemy's merchant ships on the high seas and appropriating the
goods of the private citizen found thereon, it is possible to at
once cut off the hostile state from communication with the
ports of other nations and bring the individual to terms without
giving him first cause to complain of the inhumanity of war.
Although the Continental school of writers on International
Law lay all the blame for the continuance of the old custom

